A series of five experiments used the method of magnitude estimation to assess how height and width are integrated in perceptual and in memorial judgments of area. Separate groups of subjects estimated the areas of perceived or remembered rectangles produced by a symmetrical 4 × 4 factorial design of height and width. Additional independent groups of observers made area judgments, based on special mixes of perceptual and memorial information referring to the height and width components of the to-be-judged rectangles. Both perceptual and memory data obeyed the bilinear interaction prediction of the normative multiplicative model. The relation between perceived and actual area as well as the relation between remembered and actual area could both be described by a compressive power function, with the exponent being reliably smaller for remembered than for perceived area. These results seem to imply a principle of integration rule invariance across perceptual and memorial estimates of a given set of stimuli, in conjunction with characteristically different valuation operations.
Psychophysicists have long been concerned with explicating of the functional relations between the magnitude of sensations and the objective properties of the relevant physical stimuli. Memory researchers, on the other hand, have been concerned with the relation between remembered properties of a stimulus-including its mere appearance in the past--and its objectively verifiable attributes. Despite the obvious similarity in goals, these two branches of experimental psychology have developed independently, using unrelated methods of experimentation and analysis. Psychophysics has progressed along the lines of well established, relatively rigorous quantitative techniques, whereas traditional approaches to memory have focused mainly on reproduction of given stimuli. Although a discipline of memory psychophysics has seemed a logically needed scientific routine, it had to await Moyer's (1973) pioneering research on internal psychophysical judgment.
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Memory Psychophysics
Moyer asked subjects to rank animal names in terms of relative size. Later he showed them pairs of names and asked them to judge which of the two referent animals was larger. It was found that reaction time decreased as the difference between the rated sizes increased, in a manner identical to the respective relation found with physically presented stimuli (e.g., Curtis, Paulos, & Rule, 1973) . This and similar results by others (e.g., Kerst & Howard, 1977; Paivio, 1975; Shepard, 1975; Shepard & Chipman, 1970; Shepard & Feng, 1972) , which point toward a functional equivalence between perceptual and memorial comparisons, led Moyer to suggest the existence of internal psychophysics, Shepard to propose a kind of second-order isomorphism, and finally Kerst and Howard (1978) to refer explicitly to a domain of memory psychophysics. Moyer, Bradley, Sorensen, Whiting, & Mansfield (1978) had different groups of subjects estimate the sizes of perceived and remembered stimuli. They found both sets of data to be well fitted by power functions, but the exponent was reliably smaller for the memorized size. Kerst and Howard (1978) obtained essentially the same results when different groups of observers made magnitude 452 D. ALGOM, Y. WOLF, AND B. BERGMAN estimations of geographical area either perceptually or from memory. The reappearance of the power relation in memory data is perhaps even more significant than the difference in exponent. It may serve to support the view that memorial processes parallel perceptual ones, given the same set of stimuli (e.g., Kosslyn, 1975) .
Theories of Memorial Judgments
Two explanations have been advanced for the attenuated memory exponent. According to the reperceptual hypothesis (Kerst & Howard, 1978) , perception and memory perform identical power transformations on the input data. But because the memorial transformation is applied to the product of the initial perceptual transformation rather than to the physical stimulus (see , two power transforms intervene between the memorial estimate and the physical stimulus attribute. Some formalism may be helpful.
For perception we have the normal power relation (Stevens, 1975) R = aS*.
(1)
Where R is some perceptual response, S is some property of the physical stimulus, and a and b are constants; a is a scale modulus determined by choice of units and b is the characteristic exponent. For memory, the same power relation is operative, but is applied to the perceptual representation R of the original stimulus. Therefore,
where M is a respective memorial estimate and d has the same meaning as a in Equation 1. Substituting for R in Equation 2 yields M = AS ~a,
where A is the new scaling factor. The reperceptual approach yields a quantitative, square relation prediction between the perceptual and memorial exponents. Because all perceptual dimensions examined in the literature (with a single notable exception, Kerst & Howard, 1978 , Experiment 3) were characterized by a compressive power function, it follows that the respective memorial exponents had to be even more compressive. A corollary of this hypothesis shows that plotting memorial estimates against perceptual estimates of a given set of stimuli should again yield a power relation with an exponent having the same value as that characterizing the original perceptual relation. Thus,
where A' is the appropriate scale constant. The memory-percept function shown in Equation 4 is a valuable relation, residing wholly in the subjective psychological domain. Unfortunately, it has not been examined in recent research. The alternative theory, labeled the uncertainty hypothesis may assume two forms. According to the first version (Kerst & Howard, 1978; the attenuated memory exponent is attributable to a response constriction effect produced by the greater uncertainty that observers experience in the memory condition. We propose an alternative version. Following R. Teghtsoonian (1971 Teghtsoonian ( , 1973 , we propose that the dynamic response range is what is most influenced by the greater uncertainty characterizing memory states. Owing to this uncertainty, the effective stimulus range is enlarged in memorial judgments, yielding a lower exponent. R. Teghtsoonian states that there is a highly significant negative correlation (in the order of -.94) between stimulus range and exponent value over different sensory modalities (see also Poulton, 1968) . According to our explanation, the difference in exponent value between perceptual and memorial estimates of a given set of stimuli constitutes only a special case of this general psychophysical principle.
This recent, partial, unification of memory research and psychophysics has been triggered in part by a renewed intensive investigation of mental imagery (e.g., Algom & Lewin, 1982; Algom & Singer, 1985; Kosslyn, 1978; Kosslyn, Ball, & Reisser, 1978; Paivio, 1971 Paivio, , 1975 Singer, 1966 Singer, , 1975 Singer, , 1978 Singer, , 1982 . Memory psychophysics fits nicely with this effort, its results being generally supportive of the argument for an analog mental representation (see Kosslyn et al., 1978) .
The purpose of the present series of experiments was to compare memory and perceptual judgments on a given set of stimuli by using~different kinds of functional analyses. Although the predictions of both the reper-ceptual and uncertainty hypotheses are tested in these experiments, it was not our aim to contrast them explicitly. Rather, they serve here as the theoretical background against which results are to be evaluated and further tests generated.
Functional Measurement Of
Memory Content Although memory psychophysics and mental imagery studies have provided some useful cognitive information and many intriguing possibilities, they have a substantial limitation. Most of this work is based on unifactor stimulus designs in conjunction with direct scaling techniques for obtaining the response. However, the validity of such techniques has been repeatedly questioned (see N. H. Anderson, 1970 Anderson, , 1974a Anderson, , 1975 Anderson, , 1982 Garner, 1954; Torgerson, 1961) and has never been satisfactorily established.
The validity of direct scaling techniques relies on the unjustified assumption that putative numerical ratios represent actual ratios of subjective area (e.g., N. H. Anderson, 1981; Curtis, Attneave, & Harrington, 1968) . This fundamental vulnerability prompted the development of substantive models of sensory processes whose premises are testable. Besides allowing the specification of the particular integration rule for the stimulus variables involved, such models contain the scalehthe psychophysical functionhas their natural derivative. Thus, the validation of the model constitutes a validation of the scale too (N. H. Anderson, 1970; Marks, 1979b) . The theory of scaling proposed by N. H. Anderson (1981 Anderson ( , 1982 , designated functional measurement, has been especially influential throughout different domains in psychophysics. Moreover, the unifactor stimulus designs used in current research cannot provide any test of organization principles either in memory or perception, because organization means combining different stimulus components whose exact form of interaction is of focal interest in perception and memory alike. Narrow concern of previous research with reproductive memory in conjunction with inadequate methodology have virtually precluded the possibility of studying these interactions or comparing them across different cognitive modes (e.g., perception vs. memory).
The present study evaluates some of the psychological processes that occur when people perceive and remember a given set of stimuli. We attempt to uncover the ways in which relevant stimuli interact (or fail to interact) to produce a perceptual or a memorial representation. At the same time, these perceptual and memorial products are related to the corresponding physical variables to yield validated perceptual and memorial psychophysical functions. Judgments of area of rectangles serve as our experimental tool, and the theory of scaling proposed by N. H, Anderson (e.g., 1970 Anderson (e.g., , 1981 Anderson (e.g., , 1982 as the main analytic device for both data reduction and theoretical interpretation.
Functional measurement methodology handles explicitly the rules used when people combine information from different stimulus components. Unique specification of the integration model under concern allows construction of at least interval level psychophysical functions. The approach has been successfully applied in the developmental area of study combination rules used by children to integrate height and width onto an estimate of the perceived area of rectangles (N. H. Anderson & Cuneo, 1978; Wilkening, 1979) . However, no psychophysical relations were examined in these studies. A significant feature of the present set of experiments is the systematic comparisons made across perceptual and memorial judgments of the same rectangular stimuli. The experimental conditions make possible both a simultaneous examination of the respective integration'rules for perception and memory (e.g., whether there is a change) and a stronger test of difference between the respective psychophysical functions.
Experiment l
The first experiment was designed to establish the feasibility of using the present, relatively constrained, factorial design to arrive at a quantitative appraisal of both the integration rule used and the psychophysical function(s) operative in perceptual judgments of area. Number of stimuli had to be kept within a reasonably small limit (16 rectangles constructed from a symmetrical 4 × 4 factorial design) to allow the same stimuli to serve in the subsequent memory judgment experiments. Nevertheless, the range of values 454 D. AI_G-OM, Y. WOLF, AND B. BERGMAN used was sufficiently large (a ratio of 256:1 between the areas of the largest and the smallest rectangles) to avoid strong influence of some well documented systematic effects in the derivation of the psychophysical function (e.g., Poulton, 1968; R. Teghtsoonian, 1971 R. Teghtsoonian, , 1973 .
The more substantive aim of the present experiment was to evaluate some of the psychological processes that occur when subjects judge area bounded by an out-line shape, in this case a rectangle. We attempted to uncover the way in which the necessary component variables, namely height and width, interact (or fail to interact) to produce a perceptual representation of area, but at the same time to relate these psychological products to the corresponding physical values.
Both problems have been treated in previous research, especially the relation between perceived area and stimulus area. The great bulk of this work used direct scaling procedures, notably magnitude estimation (e.g., Marks, 1974a; Stevens, 1975) , to obtain a response measure and the simple power function as the main analytic tool of data reduction (see Baird, 1970 , for a systematic review).
Early scaling experiments with area, coming mainly out of the Stockholm laboratory, demonstrated veridical perception, characterized by a psychophysical power function with an exponent close to 1.0 (Bjorkman & Strangent, 1960; Ekman & Junge, 1961; Svenson & Akesson, 1966; see also, Reese, Reese, Volkman, & Corbin, 1953) . Later studies usually using much larger stimulus ranges and controlling for more contextual factors (Baird, 1965; Ekman, 1958; Ekman, Lindman, & William-Olsson, 1961; Kerst & Howard, 1978; Mashhour & Hosman, 1968; Moyers et al., 1978; Stanek, 1969; Stevens & Guirao, 1963; M. Teghtsoonian, 1965) , generally found a compressive power function with a representative exponent of 0.80. Although judgments of area evidence the same spread of power function exponent usually found in other sensory domains (e.g., Marks, 1974b; M. Teghtsoonian, 1965) , they nevertheless seem to be a bit more stable, the great majority of exponents falling in the interval 0.60-0.90.
However, virtually all previous research is based on the use of unifactor stimulus designs.
Although useful psychophysical information has been gathered in these studies, they cannot provide a decisive test of the way in which height and width combine to produce subjective area. The present experiment, using instead a multifactor design and functional measurement techniques, allowed us to uncover the composition rule and to validate the resulting psychophysical scales.
The area of a two-dimensional surface like a rectangle is defined as the product of the linear extents of the component dimensions, Width X Height. This formal definition provides the natural context for an analogous model of perceptual integration. Despite an inconclusive first study (N. H. Anderson & Weiss, 1971; see also N. H. Anderson, 1974b) , the multiplicative metric has recurrently been demonstrated as the essential cognitive means by which adults--and children of 11 years of age and beyond--judge the area of rectangles (N. H. Anderson, 1981 Anderson, , 1982 ; N. H. Anderson & Cuneo, 1978; Wilkening, 1979) .
Although the results of the present experiment do not add new information about either the form of the psychophysical relation (compressive) or the correct metric structure (multiplicative), they do serve several valuable purposes. First, we use the same experimental paradigm later to derive psychophysical functions and integration rules at other stages of cognitive processing. Thus, the perceptual scaling data may serve as a frame of reference to evaluate subsequent memory scaling data as well as the combined perceptual-memory scaling data. Second, although information about the different aspects of area estimation-input-output relations and processing rules--has been gathered in previous research, no study has utilized all available properties in data to arrive at a quantitative appraisal of both characteristics. Earlier unifactor experiments could not handle any question regarding psychological processing, whereas the later factorial studies have typically been concerned with particular integration rules, not with deriving relevant psychophysical functions. Neither stimulus range (e.g., 16:1 was the maximum area ratio in Wilkening's 1979 study) nor response measures used (e.g., N. H. Anderson & Weiss, 1971 , asked subjects to judge the actual physical area of rectangles using a graphic rating) in these studies were really satisfactory from a psychophysical angle of attack. In the present experiment an attempt is made to examine simultaneously the "~ lao psychophysical scale and the rule for concatenating these scale values.
t4.
Method
Stimuli and design. The stimuli were rectangles outlined in 2-ram black tape on square (16 × 16 cm) gray cardboards. The vertical sides of the rectangles were solid lines, the horizontal sides were broken lines. A given figure was suspended centrally on the stimulus display, approximately 1 m from the seated subject. Four values of width (1, 2, 6, 12 cm) were combined factorially with the same values of height to make 16 stimuli in all.
Procedure. Stimuli were presented one at a time to the subject for judgment. Each subject received all values of the stimulus matrix and gave a single judgment for each rectangle. All subjects participated in some preliminary practice trials to become familiarized with both the stimulus setting and the method of scaling. Order of presentation of stimuli was irregular and different for each subject.
The method was magnitude estimation. Subjects were instructed to assign to the first stimulus whatever number seemed most appropriate to represent its area, then to assign numbers in proportion to succeeding stimuli. Subjects were told that they could use whole numbers, decimals, and fractions, as needed.
Subjects. Ten young men and women (6 men and 4 women), all volunteers from the University community, served as subjects. Their ages ranged from 24 to 30. None had previous experience with the method of magnitude estimation.
Results and Discussion
The magnitude estimates of subjective area given to each stimulus were averaged geometrically, and these means are plotted in Figure 1 as a function of the log of rectangle height. The parameter is rectangle width: Each contour represents rectangles with a different constant width. Assuming (a) a ratio or multiplicative model is operating on the psychological representations of height and width, transforming them onto subjective area and (b) an appropriate judgment function for the magnitude estimation response, the curves in Figure 1 , should form a diverging fan of straight lines. Note that the area estimates are plotted on a linear scale; this makes it possible to assess visually the metric implication of the multiplying integration rule: Divergent interaction that is approximately bilinear.
Indeed, the most striking feature of this family of functions is their tendency to diverge There is a systematic change in the number of distance units separating the approximately linear functions from one another. These characteristics suggest that the multiplying model holds for the present data to a good first-order approximation. Analysis of variance of the area judgments confirms the conclusion drawn from the visual inspection of the graphic display: Both height and width have large main effects. The critical term to assess, however, is their interaction because its magnitude and composition bear directly on the specification of the integration model. The statistical test should be applied rigorously because, as N. H. Anderson (1982) points out, interaction in a within-subjects data matrix may be biased by individual differences. In order to eliminate any subject effect (and to make the error term the Height × Width × Subject interaction), each subject's numbers were multiplied by the constant needed to make that subject's mean equal to all the other means (i.e., to the overall mean) (see Lane, Catania, & Stevens, 1961; Marks, 1980) . Results showed a significant overall interaction, F(9, 81) = 19.19, p < 0.01, nearly all of which appeared in the Linear × Linear component (accounting for 400 /1~ 97.95% of the interaction variance). If the Height × Width model is correct, then the interaction should solely be concentrated in the bilinear component; that is, the residual interaction should be negligible. The bilinear component is indeed highly significant, F(I, 9) = 169.16; p < 0.01, whereas the remainder of the interaction is not (F < 1). The question of the particular cognitive algebra used may yield to an analysis of the bilinearity evident within each subject's entire response matrix. As Figure 1 shows, the pooled data conform well to a multiplying model. So, too, do virtually all of the individual data, despite the fact that only a single judgment per stimulus was given. Graphical displays of each subject's subjective area contours (see Figure 2 for examples) show in most cases, despite greater noisiness, the expected fan of diverging lines. Although individual analyses were not possible, because each subject went through a single judgment, individual factorial plots were remarkably consistent in demonstrating the linear fan pattern, yielding additional support for an underlying multiplicative structure.
Taken as a whole, both group and individual results are approximately consistent with the metric (numeric) predictions of the multiplicative model. This model is defined by both (a) the algebraic rule used for the integration of height and width onto subjective area (Height X Width--mimicking the definition of area in formal physical terms) and (b) the judgmental task given to the subjects (validated magnitude judgments). The overall form of the functions together with the lack of any significant systematic deviation from the prescribed theoretical pattern, suggest that our adult subjects capitalized on a multiplying, Height X Width, stimulus integration rule.
As N. H. Anderson (1970 Anderson ( , 1974a ) has pointed out, given a factorial design of the type used in this study and results consistent with bilinearity in the response domain, the marginal means provide estimates of the scale values. Thus, besides providing the explicit cognitive algebra used when people judge area, the multiplying model found here plays a vital role in the derivation of the psychophysical functions as well. Because the row (height) means were essentially identical to the column (width) means (t < 1), they were averaged over the corresponding stimulus values. Figure 3 gives these calculated scale values of subjective area as a function of different sizes of the stimulus rectangle's side. Figure 4 depicts subjective area as a function of physical area.
The fits to the power functions (straight lines in the double logarithmic coordinates) are excellent (r 2 = .988 for the side function and .980 for the area function). The slopes (exponents of the power functions) are 0.724 and 0.75, respectively. This means that there exists no simple proportionality between apparent area and the physical stimulus. The psychophysical relation is instead compressive with an exponent in the vicinity of 0.75. It follows that for one rectangle to appear twice as large as another, its area would need to be about 2.5 as great. That subjective area is a compressive power function of physical area agrees with the conclusion of the great majority of previous investigations. Yet large portions of this work are suspect, because they rest on the assumption that the overt (numerical) response was (at least) an interval scale of perceived area in each case. However, as N. H. Anderson has repeatedly pointed out (e.g., 1975, 1982) , this assumption may or may not be correct in special cases, and in general it lacks needed empirical justification. The present results also suggest a compressive psychophysical function for area but this relation rests on scale values that are satisfactorily validated.
Aside from their intrinsic interest, the present findings serve as the standard perceptual model for judgments of area, to be compared in the following experiments to models of psychological area derived under various memory conditions. The question posed in these experiments is How do metric structures and psychophysical relations based on remembered area compare with their normative perceptual equivalent?
Experiment 2
The main purpose of this experiment was to attempt to uncover the rules that underlie judgments of area when those judgments are not perceptual, but rather based on stimulus representations in memory. In addition, this experiment included a perceptual control condition. The subjects in that condition were equated for their familiarity with the to-be-judged rectangles with the subjects of the memory group. As the results of Experiment l show, a compressive psychophysical power function characterizes perceptual judgments of area in conjunction with a multi= plying (Area = Height X Width) integration rule for concatenation of the subjective scale values. Do estimates based on memory representations of area reveal the same psychophysical and processing properties found with perceptual judgments? How do scale values of remembered stimuli map onto their corresponding physical referents and what rule underlies their integration onto a subjective memorial response? These questions are taken up in the present experiment.
Bjorkman, Lindberg, and Tarnblom (1960) were probably among the first to give serious consideration to an explicit exposition of a domain of memory psychophysics. Their re- suits suggested that a power function adequately characterized the memory data as well as the traditionally derived perceptual data. Unfortunately, some serious limitations in both design and method (see preclude the possibility of drawing firmer conclusions from this study. Other early explorations of the Swedish school into memory psychophysics (e.g., Ekman & Bratfisch, 1965; Lundberg & Ekman, 1972) were similarly inconclusive. Most significantly, their efforts lacked explicit experimental contrasts of perceptual and memorial psychophysical judgments. Recently, Moyer and his coworkers (1978) demonstrated that memorial magnitude estimates (i.e., the numbers assigned by observers to "imagined" stimuli as their prelearned associative names were called out by the experimenter) were power functions of the physical values of their referents. This relation was found to hold for one-, two-, and threedimensional objects that served in their different experiments. In addition, the exponents of the power functions for memory were reliably smaller than the respective perceptual exponents in all three experiments. For instance, the perceptual exponent for area judgments (the states of the Union) was 0.643, whereas the memorial exponent of the same stimuli equaled 0.463. Kerst and Howard (1978) reported similar results with respect to both the form of the memory psychophysical function and the relative magnitude of its exponent.
Recent work on memory psychophysics or, as Moyer (1973) has put it, on "internal psychophysical judgment," has produced many intriguing results and hypotheses. It constitutes an alternative to the traditional, discrete, stimulus-reproduction oriented methods of studying memory. However, this approach also suffers from the same substantial limitation as any of the various unifactor designs so prevalent at one time in psychophysics. Thus, the memorial psychophysical functions derived by both Moyer et al. and Kerst and Howard, although valuable from a methodological point of view, cannot be validated.
Failure to satisfactorily validate the memory scale values under concern has beset the work on memory psychophysics perhaps even to a greater extent than the parallel work on perceptual psychophysics. To assume that the subjects' ostensible numerical responses faithfully reflect remembered sensory magnitudes is risky at best, especially under the rather special and largely unexplored memory judgment condition. Thus, failure to recognize the full cost of restriction to unidimensional designs in previous research not only renders them largely indecisive with respect to the problem of organization in memory but also raises questions regarding their validity. Functional measurement methodology might provide this critically needed scale and response validational base (see N.H. Anderson, 1981 Anderson, , 1982 . In sum, although magnitude estimation studies of perceived and remembered size have provided useful, though, admittedly, somewhat conjectural information on the form of the psychophysical transforms, virtually nothing is known about the rules that govern combinational operations in judgments from memory.
Method
Stimuli and design. The same rectangles and viewing conditions were used as in Experiment I. In addition, 16 nonsense names (CVCs) were prepared and drawn each on a 23 X 9-cm cardboard.
Procedure. The experiment comprised two sessions. In the first session subjects learned names (CVCs) for the 16 rectangle stimuli. To facilitate the associations of names to rectangles, each rectangle had a solid line vertical side but a broken line horizontal side. We assumed that varying stimuli along an additional dimension (i.e., type of line) would increase the total amount of information transmitted or channel capacity. It has been well established within the framework of information theory research that the greater the number of stimulus dimensions, the better the recognition (e.g., N. J. Anderson & Fitts, 1958; Baird & Noma, 1978, chap. 12; Garner, 1962 Garner, , 1974 Lockhead, 1966) . ~ On the initial presentation of the stimulus series, the experimenter both showed the card and spelled out the appropriate name as each rectangle was presented. On subsequent trials the subject had to supply the name as each rectangle was presented. After the subject's response, the correct name was shown and called out by the experimenter, regardless of the subject's answer and while the stimulus rectangle was still being displayed. Order of presentation was irregular
The increased efficiency of the cognitive system with multidimensional stimuli depends on the degree of interaction among the component dimensions. The problem is known as the problem of dimensional integrality in the current literature (e.g., Garner, 1974) . and different for each subject Trials were continued until each subject reached a 300% overlearning criterion. These learning sessions took about 40-50 min per subject.
After a break of 20 min the subject returned to the laboratory to make free magnitude estimations of the rectangular stimuli. Subjects were then randomly assigned to either the memorial or the perceptual condition. In the memorial group no actual rectangles were presented. Reference rectangles were represented instead by their previously learned names. Subjects were told to imagine each stimulus rectangle as the names were shown and called out in an irregular order and then to estimate its area. In the perceptual condition, the same rectangles from the first session were presented again for judgment, one at a time.
Note, that no decision with respect to the type of the to-he-requested judgment (perceptual vs. memorial) was made during the learning session of each subject. Rather, subjects were randomly assigned to either the memorial or the perceptual group only upon their return to the laboratory for the final judgmental session. Such arrangement eliminated possible influence of the so called "demand characteristic" variables on the results (e.g., using a more lax learning criterion by the experimenter for the perceptual subjects, because they are not going to use the names later on).
The magnitude estimation instructions were those used in Experiment 1. Each subject of both groups gave a single magnitude judgment per stimulus. The experiment lasted 1-11/2 hr in all, including the intersession break.
Subjects. Twenty young University community volunteers (10 of each sex) took part in this experiment. Ages ranged between 22 to 30. No participant had served in the previous experiment and none of them had previous experience with the type of judgments required in this experiment.
Results and Discussion
We present the data from the memory condition first. Figure 5 shows the principal results. The memory magnitude estimates given to each stimulus were averaged geometrically and these means are plotted as a function of the log of rectangle height. A different curve is drawn for each width.
These data show virtually the same Height × Width interaction observed in Experiment 1. The bilinear fan pattern is clear and convincing. Individual data plots essentially replicated the results depicted in Figure  5 for the pooled data. Thus, the multiplying model seems to hold equally well for the present memory data as for the previous perceptual data.
Analysis of variance, similar to that performed on the perceptual data, bears out the visual conclusions. There is a highly significant Height × Width interaction, F(9, 81) = 41.31, p < 0.01, nearly all of which (98.87%) resides in the bilinear component. Again, the bilinear component is highly significant, F(I, 9) = 372.91, p < 0.01, but the residual interaction is not (F < 1). However, the quantities that interact bilinearly differ from the perceptual values of height and width. Rather, the present multiplying structure acts on a set of implicit values operating only in the memorial processing of visual area. These underlying memory representations are clearly different from the respective perceptual values that operate when rectangles are concurrently presented for view. The relevant results are given in Figure 6 which depicts memorized area as a function of referent physical area.
The power fit is excellent again (r 2 = .984), but the value of the exponent is 0.66, considerably lower than the previously obtained perceptual exponent (0.76) for the same rectangles. A power function (r 2 = .988) fitted to the memory estimates plotted against rectangle side length (again, corresponding marginal means for identical values of height and width were essentially equal, t < 1) yielded a similarly smaller exponent of 0.677. The results suggest a consistently lower exponent for memory judgments than for the regular perceptual judgments for a given set of stimuli. Because perceived area and remembered area are both power functions of physical area, with different exponents for the different tasks, one scale must be a power function of the other. Figure 7 shows memory estimates as a function of the perceptual estimates of the same rectangles. The fit to the power relation is good (r 2 = .904). The exponent is 0.848, a bit larger than the exponent characterizing the initial perceptual power transform.
The present findings about an attenuated memory exponent are consistent with those reported by and by Kerst and Howard (1978) , though both groups of authors failed to examine the straightforward, but, nevertheless, crucial percept-memory relation, like that shown in Figure 7 . Of course, the present memory psychophysical functions rest on properly validated scale values.
The question of a decision between the rival formulations of the reperceptual and uncertainty hypotheses remains moot. Most data, gathered in conjunction with compressive perceptual input-output relations, such as the one studied here, lack diagnostic power to arrive at a preferential choice between the alternatives. Both theories predict a more compressive memory function in such cases, as was indeed found in this experiment. The meaning attached to the memory-percept relation, such as depicted in Figure 7 , varies in the two theories~ According to the uncertainty hypothesis, this function is but an additional (though necessary) device to demonstrate the existence of a more compressive memory scale. For the reperceptual formulation, however, the function reflects an underlying psychological process, namely the power transform of the perceptually stored representation onto a memorial judgment.
The results from the memory judgment condition suggest that the cognitive algebra underlying memory-based judgments of area is the same one used in perceptual judgments of area. Both modes of cognitive activity use the normative multiplying structure. However, the valuation functions differ under the two conditions, the one for memory being more markedly compressive.
According to the results obtained in Experiment l and the memory condition of the present experiment, the multiplying pattern appears to be robust across perceptual and memorial stimulus conditions. However, the demonstrated experimental contrast of perception and memory is open to the objection that familiarity with the stimulus set was different under the two modes of cognitive activity. In Experiment l, subjects were exposed to each stimulus only once (to make their single perceptual judgment of its area), whereas learning to name the stimuli necessitated excessive exposure to each of the stimuli in the present memorial condition. Thus, the recurrent bilinear form of the data might be a bias of inadequate experimental control. The perceptual condition of the present experiment attempted to eliminate this artifactual interpretation of the Height × Width rule invariance. The data from the perceptual condition of Experiment 2 are presented next. Figure 8 shows the vital factorial plot. The data curves are clearly bilinear. In other words, the present perceptual datamequated for familiarity with the memorial data--follow the normative Height × Width pattern. It would appear, therefore, that the multiplying rule is a fairly robust strategy in adults' perceptual judgments of area.
Statistical analysis revealed a highly significant interaction, F(9, 81) --34.4, p < 0.01, the most part of which (95%) appeared in the Linear × Linear component, F(1, 9) --294.1, p < 0.01, the residual being nonsignificant, F(8, 72) = 1.927, p < 0.01. Thus, the multiplying Height × Width rule for perception of area was replicated. Figure 9 gives the psychophysical function. Perceived area relates to physical area by a power function (rE --.990) with an exponent of 0.78. Perceived area plotted against rectangle's side length yielded essentially the same power relation; exponent and rE equaled 0.78 and .994, respectively. Thus, the results of the perceptual psychophysical relations for area obtained in Experiment l are also replicated. Both perceptual exponents contrast with the considerably lower memorial exponent, in the order of 0.66, found in the memorial condition of the present experiment. Plotting the memorial estimates against the present perceptual estimates in a display analogous to that shown in Figure 7 --yielded the expected power relation (r E = .983) characterized by an exponent of 0.839.
In sum, our results failed to show any evidence for a familiarity effect on perceptual judgments of area. The results of Experiment 1 and the present perceptual condition are identical in all important respects. Both data sets evidenced the bilinear Height × Width interaction. When area estimates were plotted against physical values or against memorial estimates of the same values, for each condition, there appeared essentially the same compressive power functions as predicted by either the reperceptual or the uncertainty models.
Beyond the valuable replication, the results of the perceptual condition of the present experiment make another, perhaps even more important point. These data serve to demonstrate a fortunate property of perceptual judgments to remain invariant in the face of different levels of familiarity with the stimulus. Pre-exposure to the to-be-judged stimuli does not alter these judgments when eventually made. This finding, if replicated, has fundamental importance because valid psychophysical analyses are possible at different levels of stimulus pre-exposure without immediate need to control for these levels. Of course, this is a basic assumption in the metatheory of perception and psychophysics, and is used ubiquitously, albeit implicitly, by various investigators. It is assuring, therefore, to see it experimentally demonstrated.
The present observation should not be confused with the many well-known intrajudgment biases present in various psychophysical tasks (e.g., the time-order error). Previous judgments do exercise influence on later ones, previous presentations of stimuli in a nonjudgmental context apparently do not. The interested reader may well want to contrast this constancy of perceptual estimates to the relatively strong effect that nonreinforced pre-exposures of the to-be-conditioned stimulus have on subsequent acquisition in the field of learning. This phenomenon has been called "latent inhibition" (Lubow, 1973) .
Experiment 3
The results of Experiments 1 and 2 verify and generalize the Height X Width pattern for both perceptual and memorial judgments of area. The valuation function, however, was found to differ across the two stimulus conditions.
The demonstration that information about physical objects is represented and processed in memory via functionally similar cognitive systems to those utilized in perception led to the present extension. In all previous investigations of memory psychophysics as well as in Experiment 2, subjects were asked to retrieve a referent stimulus from memory, one which has previously been presented perceptually in its entirety. Judgments of area in the present experiment are based instead on exposure of two separate straight lines (one horizontal, the other vertical) to be considered by subjects as the respective width and height of an appropriate rectangle. In one condition such pairs of lines are physically presented. In the other--memorial--condition the lines are symbolically represented by prelearned names. The question asked here is What rules underlie judgments of area of rectangles when these rectangles are all constructed in memory, without a complete previous physical referent?
Method Stimuli and design. The stimuli were eight straight lines drawn in 2-mm black tape on square (16 X 16 cm) gray cardboards. Four solid lines were presented vertically, and four broken lines horizontally. Eight CVCs from those prepared in Experiment 2 were also used. Viewing conditions were the same as in the previous experiments.
Horizontal and vertical lengths were 1, 2, 6, and 12 cm, that is, the same values used for rectangle sides in the previous experiments.
Procedure. The experiment contained two phases, (a) a learning session during which the subject was trained to name the line stimuli and (b) a psychophysical judgment session involving estimates of imagery rectangles whose sides are made of the previously presented lines.
During the learning session, the experimenter showed the card and spelled out the appropriate name as each line was presented. On later trials the subject supplied the name, to be followed by feedback from the experimenter (calling out and showing the right name). Order of presentation was irregular and different for each subject. Acquisition was continued until a 300% overlearning criterion was reached. These learning sessions took about 20 rain per subject.
After a 20-min break, subjects returned for the second session. They were then randomly assigned to either a memory condition (symbolic representation of lines) or a perceptual condition (actual presentation of lines). They were instructed to mentally form an imaginary rectangle whose vertical side was one of the vertically presented (solid) lines from the first session and whose horizontal side was one of the horizontally presented (broken) lines from the same meeting. Then, they were asked to give an estimate of its area.
In the memory group no actual lines from the learning session were presented. Heights and widths were rather represented by their prelearned names (CVCs). The experimenter covaried factorially the names for the vertical and horizontal dimentions to produce 16 imagery rectangle stimuli in all. For a random half of the subjects the name representing rectangle height was situated to the left of the observer's focus and the name for width to its right, whereas for the others the name for rectangle width appeared to the left and the name for height on the right. Presented with a given pair of names, the subject had to imagine an appropriate rectangle produced by the respective memory representations of its height and width.
In the perceptual condition each subject was presented with a pair of lines (one horizontal, the other vertical) 2 and asked to imagine the rectangle formed by them as its respective sides. The vertical and horizontal lines from the learning session were covaried factoriaily to produce ~. the usual 16 rectangle stimuli. Relative positions of the in vertical and horizontal displays were varied across random ua halfs of the subjects. Presented with a given pair of lines, the subject had to imagine an appropriate rectangle ~ 1 w whose height and width were equal to the respective ac vertical and horizontal displays. ~[ Area judgments were obtained through the method of magnitude estimation, as in Experiment 1. e~
Subjects. Twenty young men and women (9 men and 6 11 women), ages 23-31, participated in this experiment. --, 0 None had taken part in any of the previous experiments.
Results and Discussion
Results from the memory condition are presented first. The magnitude estimates given to each mental rectangle--no physical ones were presented--were averaged geometrically and these means are plotted in Figure 10 as a function of rectangle height. A different curve is drawn for each width.
The most striking characteristic of this family of functions is, again, their linear divergence (or convergence). Thus, even for area of imagery rectangles--stimuli con- structed wholly subjectively--the integration rule is one of multiplication of component scale values. Statistical analysis revealed a highly significant interaction, F(9, 81) = 22.15, p < 0.01, 99% of which was concentrated in the bilinear component. This component was highly significant, F(I, 9) = 197.57, whereas the remainder of the interaction was not (F < 1).
Note that the Height × Width integration rule found here does not take place automatically with stimulus presentation. In a sense, integration is optional, for it is induced by directing the subjects to form rectangles mentally and then to estimate their areas. Nevertheless, this integration rule, resting solely on an internal stimulus construct, mirrors accurately the cognitive metric used when the global stimulus is physically present. Figure 11 gives the psychophysical relation. Note that the graphic display depicts area estimates against rectangles that were not presented, but are produced by the respective lines taken as their height and width.
The power fit is again excellent (r 2 = .986), with an exponent in the order of 0.62. Area estimate plotted against rectangle side (averaged over height and width) yielded a similarly good fit to a power function (r z = .996) and an exponent of 0.65. These exponents are generally consistent with those obtained in the memory condition of Experiment 2, but not with those of Experiment 1 and with the perceptual condition of Experiment 2. Thus, the exponents observed for the present memory condition are once again substantially smaller than those observed for the perceptual conditions in Experiments l and 2. These findings support the argument that memorypsychophysical functions have shallower slopes than their perceptual counterparts.
There is no evidence for multiple memory scales despite the obvious difference in design between Experiments 2 and 3. In Experiment 2 the to-be-judged rectangles were presented and apparently stored as such, whereas only their components were shown in Experiment 3 with no indication as to their later use. However, no significant difference in slope was evident between the two sets of memory judgments. The valuation operations in memory seem, therefore, fairly invariant across different cognitive demands referring to a given stimulus set.
The memorial results of the present experiment-metric structure and psychophysical functions--stand in contrast to the perceptual findings of Experiments l and 2. But, is this a fair comparison? The memorial judgments were based on physical pre-exposures of straight lines, that is, components only of the to-be-formed stimulus. On the other hand, the perceptual judgments from Experiments 1 and 2 were based both on presentations of the complete stimulus. The intermediate condition of physically presenting the subject with a pair of lines, one horizontal the other vertical, in order to arrive at an (perceptual?) estimate of the resultant rectangle can provide the needed comparison. These results, from the second group of the present experiment, are presented next. Figure 12 gives the factorial plot. Again, no notable deviations from the expected bilinear fan pattern exist in the data.
The Vertical × Horizontal interaction was significant, F(9, 81) = 13.66, p < 0.01. The bilinear component accounted for a significantly large portion of the interaction variance, 97.64%, F(l, 9) --120.01, p < 0.01, leaving a nonsignificant residual variance (F < l).
The recurrent emergence of the multiplying model in both conditions of the present experiment should come, perhaps, as no sur- prise, because the salient dimensions of height and width were especially emphasized in these designs. Note that the judged stimuli of the present "perceptual" condition constitute a rather peculiar mix of perceptions and images. Although the height and width components were presented physically for perception, the requested rectangular stimuli were not and had to be mentally constructed by the subjects. The question of interest here is what scale values underlie the present judgments of area. Are they closer to the perceptual values of Experiments l and 2, or rather to the memorial values of Experiment 2 and the present memory condition?
To answer this question, it is necessary to examine the psychophysical function. It turned out to be markedly compressive, regardless of whether physical area or side length are taken as the independent variable. The exponents of the respective power functions were 0.58 and 0.572 (power fits, rEs, equaled .986 and .994, respectively).
There seems to be little difference between the exponent characterizing the present, rather unique, perceptual judgments and the previous memorial exponents. The cognitive op-erations imposed by the imagery part of the experimental task seems to dominate the valuation process as well.
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Experiment 4
Suppose you are familiar with two separate 12 o stimuli, only one of which is physically present. Suppose further that you combine them t~ together in your own world of fantasy. What rules underlie the concatenation of the resultant subjective values of such (rather common, "~ 6o to be sure) percepto-memorial combination? What shape will the valuation function as-. 
Method
RECTANGLE HEIGHT
Stimuli and design. The same eight lines from Experiment 3 were used again. Four CVCs from the initial pool of 16 were also used.
Procedure. Subjects came to an initial learning session during which they were trained to associate names to each of four vertical line stimuli. Methods of stimulus presentation, response evocation, and experimenter feedback were the same as in Experiment 3. These sessions lasted approximately 10-12 min per subject.
The second session followed a 20 min break. In a trial, subjects were presented with a name from those learned in the previous session in conjunction with a horizontally presented linear line. They were asked to imagine a rectangle whose height equaled the vertical line symbolized via its name and whose width is given by the physically present horizontal line. Then, they gave an estimate of its area.
The experimenter covaried factorially the names (representing the different values of height) and the four horizontal lines (representing width) thus producing 16 imagery stimulus rectangles in all. Pilot study revealed no difference between a memorial height and a perceptual width and the reversed arrangement. We arbitrarily chose the first arrangement throughout for sake of convenience. The method, again, was magnitude estimation.
Subjects. Ten young adults (5 of each sex) aged between 22 and 39 took part in this experiment. None had participated in any of the previous experiments. Figure 13 gives the results bearing on the integration rule. Again, the Height X Width model holds firmly. Essentially all of the significant interaction variance, F(9, 81)= 37.05, p < 0.01, is concentrated in the Linear X Linear component (99.55%).
Results and Discussion
The main burden of this experiment is not Note that information about the most salient aspects of the judged stimuli (i.e., height and width) was presented perceptually for one component, memorially for the other. We expected valuation operations to reflect this difference. In particular, the exponent of the function based on the perceptually presented values was predicted to be consistent with earlier perceptual exponents. In a similar vein we expected the exponent of the memory function to conform to earlier values from the memorial conditions, that is, to differ significantly from the complementary perceptual exponent.
The results failed to support these predictions. Marginal means for corresponding values of height and width were virtually identical (t < 1), despite the alternative means of conveying stimulus information. The respective psychophysical power functions had virtually the same exponents in the order of 0.68 (0.683 and 0.686, for the perceptual and memorial scales, respectively; r2s = .977, in both cases).
Again, the cognitive demand of forming mentally the rectangular stimulus from given components---regardless of their mode of generation--seems to engulf all facets of the experimental task. Not only did the normative Height × Width rule replicate, but the dominant imagery operation imposed identical valuation functions, regardless of cognitive origin.
Exponent magnitude lies somewhere between the values of the previously obtained perceptual and memorial exponents. Why? According to one speculation the subjects recognized the equality of corresponding height and width values. They substituted, therefore, the corresponding (physically presented) horizontal length for a given vertical name by an operation reminiscent of mental rotation. Thus, the symbolic presentation lost its effectiveness as a memory device, making explanation of results complicated. At this point, we decided to replicate Experiment 4 using different values for height and width, in order to see whether these findings had any generality. Procedure. The heights of the to-be-formed rectangular shapes (vertical lines) were presented together with apprepriate names in the learning session. These names and the horizontal lines---representing width--were shown pairwise in the final judgmental session. In all other procedural details this experiment was identical to the previous one.
Subjects. Six adult subjects, all women, took part in this experiment. Ages ranged from 19 to 26 years. None had participated in any of the previous experiments.
The Area = Height × Width model reappeared, supported by both a bilinear fan pattern and the results of the statistical analysis. This revealed a significant interaction, F(9, 45) = 8.06, p < 0.01, the great part of which (92%) was concentrated in the bilinear component, F(I, 9) = 67.1, p < 0.01.
Again, no substantial memory-percept differences were found in the psychophysical function. Both power functions were highly compressive, being clearly in the memory domain. The memorial (marginal mean) height function had an exponent of 0.553 (r 2 = .985), whereas the complementary perceptual function was characterized by an exponent of 0.494 (r 2 = .999). The somewhat larger memory exponent is perhaps attributable to the considerably larger range of width values (e.g., R. Teghtsoonian, 1971 Teghtsoonian, , 1973 .
The conclusions of the previous experiment are, therefore, underscored by the results of the present percept-memory mix, which, once again, show a dominance of memorial operations in valuation processes.
General Discussion
Cognitive Algebra of the Processing of Subjective Area
The results of the present study are consistent with the hypothesis of a multiplying model operating in the integration of height and width onto subjective area. However, the recurrent finding of a clear Height × Width perceptual composition rule in the present research is neither new nor really surprising. As N. H. Anderson and Cuneo (1978) observe, this rule is perceptually the most economical and the one which results almost automatically from a direct judgment of area. In their seminal developmental study, the 1 lyear-old children (their oldest group) showed a consistent multiplying rule, as was the case with the older children in Verge and Bogartz's (1978) and Wilkening's (1979) studies. Wilkening demonstrated a multiplicative structure for his adult subjects, replicating the somewhat less convincing findings of N. H. Anderson and Weiss (1971) . Thus, the Area = Height × Width composition rule seems well-founded in current research. The present study provides additional support for this perceptual strategy using the method of free magnitude estimation in conjunction with considerably larger ranges of height and width than used in previous investigations.
The reappearance of the normative Height × Width pattern in memorial estimates of area constitutes the main core of the present findings. Even more important than the specific form assumed by the memorial integration rule is the fact that it mirrors the rule used in the original perceptual representation. These results are significant in showing that the integration rule used in perceptual judgments of quantity preserves its form when the same task is re-employed using memorybased judgments. If this principle of integration rule invariance across perception and memory of a given stimulus proves general, it may well operate as a powerful organizational tool in memory.
Perceptual and Memorial Psychophysical Functions
Besides providing the explicit cognitive algebra used when people judge area by visual inspection or from memory, the multiplicative model found here plays a vital role in the derivation of the psychophysical functions as well. It was possible to construct these functions for either height or width as the independent variables directly from the marginal means of the factorial designs (Note that area is given by a linear transformation of either of its linear components). The multiplicative model provides the needed criterion to validate the numerical estimates given by the subjects and on the basis of which the psychophysical functions are derived. The present results indicate that the psychophysical functions for both perceived and remembered areas are compressive power functions of physical area or either of its definitional components. However, the memory functions turned out to be even more markedly nonlinear than their perceptual counterparts.
Because both modes of cognitive representation yield power functions of the common physical stimulus, one scale must be a power (i.e., nonlinear) function of the other. The present results bear out this prediction. Thus, given a visually presented rectangle, there are two sets of values for both height and width. One set of values operates when immediate judgments of area are called for, whereas another (nonlinearly) related set of values operates when subjects are asked to estimate area from memory.
The exact form of exponent relation is still uncertain, however. Although the present results are not incompatible with the square relation predicted by the reperceptual hypothesis, they do not bear out this prediction in an unequivocal way. A clear decision between the theoretical alternatives awaits examination of expansive psychophysical dimensions (i.e., those characterized by a greater than unity power function exponent) where differential predictions exist. For expansive dimensions the reperceptual hypothesis predicts a steeper memory function (the memory exponent should equal the square of the greater than 1 perceptual exponent), whereas the uncertainty formulation still predicts an attenuated memory function. Preliminary results from our laboratory (using electric shocks) point toward the reperceptual version as probably the valid theory.
An interesting aspect of the present data was the pervasiveness of memory scale values across different mixes of perceptual and memorial information. Exponents obtained under conditions in which some perception and some memory of stimulus components were used and in which memorial construction of the relevant stimuli was required generally agreed with those obtained in the simple memory condition. That is, scale values for memory dominate even when memorial and perceptual information must be combined in cognitive judgment. Is this a stimulus specific phenomenon or indicative of a general-purpose cognitive strategy? Further experiments are clearly needed to clarify the respective roles of perceptual and memorial information in common cognitive processing.
Implications for Mental Representation
A basic problem concerns the psychological mechanism that underlies the formal multiplying model. Does the integration rule uncovered in the present research reflect real mental processes or is it just a formal summary of unknown psychological processes?
On a more superficial level, the authenticity of area perception was questioned at least as early as 1960 by M. Teghtsoonian. In a later definitive study (1965) she showed that the exponent depends strongly on instructions. It is possible to instruct subjects to make their judgments conform to either apparent area or to the actual physical area. If the observer judges objective area, then the exponent may rise to approximately 1.0. For example, subjects reported judging the physical area of circles and squares by first estimating the linear dimension and then squaring it. Only when apparent instructions are given--to judge how large the stimulus looks--does the exponent range between 0.60 and 0.90, with the majority of values falling at around 0.80 (see Baird, 1970) . The instructions in the present series of experiments stressed apparent size and immediate and spontaneous responses. In cases of confusion, subjects were explicitly discouraged from performing mental calculations. Nevertheless, the subject could estimate height and width, multiply the two, and report the result (see Butler & Overshiner, 1983) . Interviews revealed that only a small minority did so, and then only occasionally (see also N. H. Anderson & Weiss, 1971; Baird, 1965) . In fact, Stevens and Guirao (1963) consider calculation-based responses as not valid, because the subject did not judge his sensation, but rather, committed the well-known "stimulus error."
On a more basic level, what substantive form may the multiplying integration rule assume? N. H. Anderson and Weiss (1971) , N. H. Anderson and Cuneo (1978) , and Wilkening (1979) suggest a mechanism of repeated addition. In particular subjects may "Imagine the area sliced up and the slices transported and relocated end to end" (Wilkening, 1979, p. 32) or "the figure could be scanned with a unit square in the mind's eye and a count made of the number of times this square covered the figure" (N. H. Anderson & Cuneo, 1978, p. 361) . Such a psychologically additive mechanism could still produce the bilinear fan pattern and the multiplicative data set. Appealing as this hypothesis might appear it is incompatible with the present markedly compressive psychophysical functions for area. Earlier studies also report compressive functions for a variety of shapes. Failure of integration studies to examine the respective psychophysical relations has limited their ability to draw conclusions about mental processes. Simultaneous examination of both metric structure and scale values is necessary.
Although explanations can be rejected on the basis of the experiments reported in this study, it is, nevertheless, true that alternative arguments can be proposed to account for the present multiplicative data. Functional measurement methodology leaves a certain indeterminacy with respect to the nature of the mental processes underlying judgments of area and producing the multiplicative integration rule. Composition rules and psychophysical scales at different stages of cognitive activity are best regarded as constraints on any process-based hypothesis regarding mental representation. Still, the factorial scheme can be used repeatedly and hierarchially to validate different scales and integration rules in order to tighten those constraints to the point that they constitute a comprehensive cognitive theory. Just such a routine recently enabled Marks (1979a) to propose a new theory of loudness and loudness judgment (see also, Algom & CohenRaz, 1984; Algom & Marks, 1984; Marks, 1978 Marks, , 1979b Marks, , 1983 . Thus, although functional measurement methodology is clearly limited with respect to a unique determination of any given claim for mental representation as valid, it can help to separate these claims, at times to the point of explicit rejection of several alternatives.
The present research should, therefore, be considered as a first step only in a combined system-oriented investigation of perception and memory. The following conclusions seem warranted:
1. Memory scale values map onto their physical referents via the same functional relation (power transform) as perceptual scale values do. These findings provide needed support for the reliability of memory-based reports. Such reports, to be sure, are used thoroughly in psychology (Moyer & Dumais, 1978; Shepard & Podgorny, t978) and have considerable practical importance. To cite just one example, remembered pain plays a vital role within the framework of medicine, theory, and research alike (e.g., Rofe & Algom, 1985; Weisenberg, 1980 Weisenberg, , 1983 .
2. Not only do memorial judgments demonstrate an orderly relation to their corresponding physical stimuli, but they also relate via the same functional relation to the relevant perceptual judgments. Final specification of this relation must, however, await further experimentation and theorizing.
3. Judgments of area based on perception and memory of a given set of stimuli are functionally similar in that both obey a multiplicative integration rule of height and width. If this finding proves to enjoy some generality, then it argues for a constancy of the original perceptual integration rule across different memorial tasks accompanied by different valuation operations. These results bear heavily on current controversies regarding the nature of mental imagery (J. R. Anderson, 1978) . The conflicting arguments center on the issue of internal representation of information. According to one main theoretical position (see Kosslyn & Pomerantz, 1977; Kosslyn et al., 1978 , Shepard & Podgorny, 1978 visual imagery is encoded in spatial terms and processed in quasi-perceptual ways. The alternative theory (e.g., J. R. Anderson & Bower, 1973; Pylyshyn, 1973 Pylyshyn, , 1981 holds that imagery is encoded and represented in abstract propositional format and processed in quasi verbal, sometimes logical ways.
The present findings offer preliminary Support for the first position, the so called analog representation theory in mental imagery (e.g., Cooper & Shepard, 1973; Kosslyn et al., 1978; Moyer, 1973; Paivio, 1975; Shepard & Feng, 1972; Shepard & Metzler, 1971 ; see J. R. Anderson, 1978 , for a fairly systematic review). These studies used ingenious designs, including the well-known tasks of "mental rotation," "mental paper folding," and "mental walk" to name but a few, suggesting the existence of a second-order isomorphism between objects and their internal representations (Shepard & Chipman, 1970 ). Yet the majority of this research (with a couple of notable exceptions) used unifactorial stimulus designs, thus reducing the possibilities of addressing processing properties. The present factorial scheme bypasses some of the difficulties and provides needed characterization of the relevant cognitive operation besides providing a description of the valuation process. Indeed, the present experiments may provide the first definitive evidence for an operation-based second-order isomorphism between internal and physical relations by demonstrating a perceptual mode of processing in memory.
4. Memorial scale values dominate whenever perceptual and remembered information is combined in cognitive judgment. Again, these results have important practical implications.
5. Functional measurement methodology can serve to reject certain classes of competing theories which argue for particular mental representations. For example, in the present case we were able to reject repeated addition formulations (e.g., N. H. Anderson & Cuneo, 1978) and can reject any theory of representation incompatible with a multiplicative rule of integration (e.g., formulations that relate representation of area to only a single component as in children's judgments of area, or those that result in some form of additivity of components). Negatively stated, the functional approach does, not at this stage, permit firm conclusions about a particular mental representations.
Many questions remain to be answered by future experimentation. Memory in the present experiments was fairly recent, activated about 20 min after the original learning. Would the presently found memory-percept invariance prevail at much longer intervals as well? A plausible argument can be made for a shift to a (more primitive?) additive metric at longer spans of, say, days and beyond. Is the flow of information from short-term to long-term memory accompanied by substantive changes in the respective integration rules, valuation functions or both? We are intrigued by these possibilities but can offer little guidance in deciding among the alternatives. Further research using diverse methods of experimentation and analysis is what is needed.
